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INTRODUCTION 
“Thousands Take to Streets Across the Country to Protest Family 
Separation at Border;”1 “A Week of Questions, Tears and Finger-pointing 
on Immigrant Family Separations;”2 “Federal Judge: Separating Families 
at Border May Violate Due Process Rights;”3 “Family Separations at the 
Border: How Did We Get Here?”4 
In the summer of 2018, a united and forceful public outcry mounted 
in response to the United States government’s family separation policy at 
the U.S.-Mexico border.5 Americans across the political spectrum pro-
tested as pictures, videos, and audio recordings of children being forcibly 
separated from their parents were circulated nationwide.6 The mainstream 
media, in its coverage of this disaster, reported on the devastating conse-
quences of removing children from their parents.7 Medical groups were 
outraged about the impact on children,8 describing the separations as 
 
 1 Daniel Politi, Thousands Take to Streets Across the Country to Protest Family Separa-
tion at Border, SLATE (June 23, 2018, 8:04 PM), https://perma.cc/3T44-EPDN. 
 2 Faith Karimi, A Week of Questions, Tears and Finger-pointing on Immigrant Family 
Separations, CNN POLITICS (June 24, 2018, 1:14 PM), https://perma.cc/6UWA-RGF6. 
 3 Christopher Coble, Federal Judge: Separating Families at Border May Violate Due 
Process Rights, FINDLAW: LAW & DAILY LIFE (June 11, 2018, 6:57 AM), 
https://perma.cc/A2ZA-7VGE. 
 4 David Lauter & Jazmine Ulloa, Family Separations at the Border: How Did We Get 
Here?, L.A. TIMES (June 19, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://perma.cc/UC7E-LD2A. 
 5 See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael D. Shear, How Trump Came to Enforce a 
Practice of Separating Migrant Families, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/P32V-
GC5D; Salvador Rizzo, The Facts About Trump’s Policy of Separating Families at the Bor-
der, WASH. POST (June 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/J8Z5-UH8W; The Family Separation Cri-
sis at the U.S. Border, VOX, https://perma.cc/7V72-X7KT (last visited Sept. 27, 2018). 
 6 See, e.g., Adam Shaw, Republican Pressure Intensifies to End Family Separations at 
Border, FOX NEWS (June 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/J9F2-EVJ6; David Smith & Tom Phil-
lips, Child Separations: Trump Faces Extreme Backlash from Public and His Own Party, 
GUARDIAN (June, 19, 2018, 2:23 PM), https://perma.cc/3BP6-952U; Ginger Thompson, Listen 
to Children Who’ve Just Been Separated from Their Parents at the Border, PROPUBLICA (June 
18, 2018, 3:51 PM), https://perma.cc/5XFK-MASS (displaying a video of separated children 
crying); Li Zhou, These Photos Were the Trump Administration’s Attempt to Quiet Criticism. 
They’re Only Increasing Critics’ Horror, VOX (June 18, 2018, 3:20 PM), 
http://perma.cc/2PRU-L363. 
 7 See, e.g., Melissa Healy, ‘Children Must Not Be Abused for Political Purposes’: What 
Health Groups Say About Family Separation, L.A. TIMES (June 20, 2018, 2:55 PM), 
https://perma.cc/QA6M-MT8W (listing the health consequences of adversity in childhood); 
Thompson, supra note 6 (describing that separated children in detention facilities were wailing 
and sobbing); William Wan, What Separation from Parents Does to Children: ‘The Effect is 
Catastrophic’, WASH. POST (June 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/AKM4-98XA. 
 8 See Healy, supra note 7; Devin Miller, AAP a Leading Voice Against Separating Chil-
dren, Parents at Border, AAP NEWS (June 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/D97S-HLUE (arguing 
that family separations can cause “irreparable harm” to children). The American Public Health 
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“child abuse.”9 Due process and judicial oversight for the separated fam-
ilies seemed to be non-existent.10 
The strong reactions to the family separations at the border were, and 
continue to be, warranted. The children’s plight and their parents’ suffer-
ing cannot be overstated. The atrocious policies that legalized the border 
family separations do not exist in a vacuum, however. The justified public 
anger about the border separations provides an opportunity for a deeper 
critique of government policies that allow children to be removed from 
their parents in the United States. 
Family separation is a government tool of oppression that has a 
deeply rooted history in the United States, tracing back to the colonization 
of indigenous people and to chattel slavery.11 The U.S. government’s dis-
regard for the families at the border, while upsetting, was not surprising 
to poor, Black, and Brown communities in the U.S., who have been tar-
 
Association has cited consistent research findings that, “family structure, stability and envi-
ronment are key social determinants of a child’s and a community’s health.” Press Release, 
Am. Pub. Health Ass’n & Trust for America’s Health, Separating Parents and Children at US 
Border is Inhumane and Sets the Stage for a Public Health Crisis (June 15, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/2QB2-L8VA. 
 9 Justin Wise, American Academy of Pediatrics President: Trump Family Separation 
Policy is ‘Child Abuse’, HILL (June 18, 2018, 12:56 PM), https://perma.cc/7D9Y-NXQX. 
 10 See, e.g., Susan Ferriss, How Border Migration is Testing the Public’s Grasp of Due 
Process and U.S. Asylum Obligations, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, https://perma.cc/XQR2-
TGPK (last updated July 26, 2018, 5:18 PM); Fact Sheet: Family Separation at the U.S.-
Mexico Border, NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM (July 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/6ZCC-3APV; 
The Facts Behind the Headlines: Family Separation at the Border, AMS. FOR IMMIGRANT 
JUSTICE, https://perma.cc/U44V-MSSH (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). In early 2019, a govern-
ment watchdog report stated that thousands more children had been forcibly separated from 
their parents than previously reported, but that the total number is unknown due to the gov-
ernment failing to keep track of children it had taken. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEPARATED CHILDREN PLACED IN OFFICE OF 
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT CARE (2019). 
 11 See ELISA MINOFF, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. POL’Y, ENTANGLED ROOTS: THE ROLE 
OF RACE IN POLICIES THAT SEPARATE FAMILIES 17-18 (2018) (citations omitted) (discussing 
the colonization and the forced assimilation of Native American children to European culture 
through family separations); Tanya Asim Cooper, Racial Bias in American Foster Care: The 
National Debate, 97 MARQ L. REV. 215, 235-36 (2013) (summarizing, briefly, the history of 
Native American persecution in the United States, from European colonization up to removing 
and placing high numbers of Native American children with white families); Gloria Ann Whit-
tico, If “Past Is Prologue”: Toward the Development of a New “Freedom Suit” for the Reme-
diation of Foster Care Disproportionalities Among African-American Children, 43 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 407, 411-13 (2015) (examining the effects of chattel slavery on Black families); Kurt 
Mundorff, Note, Children as Chattel: Invoking the Thirteenth Amendment to Reform Child 
Welfare, 1 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 131, 168-70 (2003) (recounting the destruction 
of Black families through the American slavery system). For more information on how slavery 
disrupted Black families, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 171, 178-79 (2003). 
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geted by a multitude of policies that weaken their families. Policies tar-
geting these groups have been carried out in the housing, criminal, immi-
gration, public benefits, and child welfare systems, among others.12 For 
marginalized people in this country, the piercing cries of children being 
ripped from parents’ arms are an all-too-familiar horror.13 
Forced family separations traumatize children and their parents; nev-
ertheless, forced family separations in the U.S. child welfare system have 
not garnered the same media attention as the recent border separations.14 
One explanation for this difference is that the U.S. child welfare system 
presents itself as noble, well-intentioned, and in service of families in 
 
 12 See generally MINOFF, supra note 11, for a description of U.S. government policies 
separating families in the immigration, criminal justice, and child welfare systems; WALTER 
A. EWING ET AL., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNSEL, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2015), for an analysis of using the ever-broadening criminal justice system 
as a tool to deport increasing numbers of immigrants; MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: 
POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2016), for stories of poor families in Milwaukee 
caught in the cycle of home evictions; MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010), for an exploration of how the U.S. 
government continues to incarcerate and target communities of color through policies repack-
aged as colorblind; KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST 
NOTHING IN AMERICA (2015), for a study finding that modern welfare policies fail to ade-
quately support poor families; and KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 
(2017), for an examination of the U.S. government’s destruction of poor women’s privacy 
rights. 
 13 See Erin Cloud et al., Family Defense in the Age of Black Lives Matter, 20 CUNY L. 
REV. 68, 69 (2017) (explaining that the child welfare system routinely targets and destroys the 
bonds between Black children and their families); Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, 
and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1487 (2012) (citing 
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Racial Geography of Child Welfare: Toward a New Research Para-
digm, 87 CHILD WELFARE 125, 131-32 (2008) [hereinafter Roberts, Racial Geography]) (“The 
spatial concentration of child welfare supervision [in Black neighborhoods] creates an envi-
ronment in which state custody of children is a realistic expectation, if not the norm.”); see 
generally TINA LEE, CATCHING A CASE: INEQUALITY AND FEAR IN NEW YORK CITY’S CHILD 
WELFARE SYSTEM (2016) (documenting the punitive nature of the child welfare system, which 
punishes parents for their poverty and removes children instead of providing families with the 
necessary support for the children to remain at home); DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATTERED 
BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002). 
 14 Chris Gottlieb, Child Separations, Here at Home: We Remove Far, Far Too Many Kids 
from Their Families in the Name of Saving Them, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 2, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/S6N7-H9QD. For example, there has been relatively little media attention 
given to the fact that the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS), New York City’s child 
welfare agency, removed approximately 2,300 children from their homes because of “emer-
gency” circumstances between 2016 and 2018. ABIGAIL KRAMER, THE NEW SCH.: CTR. FOR 
N.Y.C. AFFAIRS, CHILD WELFARE SURGE CONTINUES: FAMILY COURT CASES, EMERGENCY 
CHILD REMOVALS REMAIN UP 3 (2018) [hereinafter KRAMER, CHILD WELFARE SURGE 
CONTINUES], https://perma.cc/GKK9-KQGB. 
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need.15 There is also a commonly held misconception in U.S. society that 
children are only removed from their parents and placed in foster care in 
extreme cases, such as when parents cause intentional physical or sexual 
harm to their children.16 In truth, the majority of families investigated by 
child protective services are scrutinized because of poverty-related ne-
glect instead of abuse.17 The correlation between child welfare involve-
ment and poverty also contributes to the overrepresentation of Black and 
Brown children in foster care, as they are more likely than white children 
to experience poverty.18 The harsh reality is that the child welfare system 
often does more to hurt children than to protect them. 
With the same urgency and call to action with which the American 
public responded to the family separations at the border, this Note exam-
ines the lack of due process, the injustice, and the trauma caused by the 
 
 15 See Matthew I. Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality Laws and the Master 
Narrative of Child Welfare, 63 ME. L. REV. 1, 8-16 (2010) (describing the meta-narrative about 
child welfare, including the view that all children are innocent child victims needing protection 
from bad parents). 
 16 Id. at 8-9 (discussing that the “master narrative” of child welfare promotes the perspec-
tive that system-involved children have been brutally abused by their parents). Across the 
country, 78.3% of children were deemed “neglected” rather than subjected to extreme forms 
of abuse, such as physical or sexual abuse. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. 
FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, 
CHILD MALTREATMENT 20 (2012). 
 17 See, e.g., Radley Balko, The Ongoing Criminalization of Parenthood (and Poverty), 
WASH. POST: WATCH (Aug. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/3DDZ-4MMG (discussing the all-too-
common narrative of children being removed from their home due to poverty related condi-
tions); Rachel Aviv, Where is Your Mother? A Woman’s Fight to Keep Her Child, NEW 
YORKER (Dec. 2, 2013), https://perma.cc/7FXR-93WS (telling the story of a single mother 
who left her son home while she went to work, and lost custody as a result). Statistically, 
families living below the poverty line are twenty times more likely to be forced into the child 
welfare system than families living slightly above the poverty line. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, 
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CHILD PROTECTION LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES, in REPRESENTING 
PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES: ADVICE AND GUIDANCE FOR FAMILY DEFENDERS 17 (Mar-
tin Guggenheim & Vivek S. Sankaran eds., 2015) (citation omitted). See Emma S. Kettering-
ham et al., Healthy Mothers, Healthy Babies: A Reproductive Justice Response to the “Womb-
to-Foster-Care-Pipeline,” 20 CUNY L. REV. 77, 86-87 (2016) [hereinafter Ketteringham et 
al., Healthy Mothers, Healthy Babies], for additional theories as to why low-income families 
are particularly vulnerable to child protective involvement. 
 18 See Stephanie Smith Ledesma, The Vanishing of the African-American Family: “Rea-
sonable Efforts” and its Connection to the Disproportionality of the Child Welfare System, 9 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 29, 47 (2014); TRINA SHANK ET AL., INSIGHT CTR. FOR CMTY. ECON. 
DEV., DIVERGING PATHWAYS: HOW WEALTH SHAPES OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHILDREN 2 (2011), 
https://perma.cc/T7W5-5EHS; Amy Mulzer & Tara Urs, However Kindly Intended: Struc-
tural Racism and Volunteer CASA Programs, 20 CUNY L. REV. 23, 27 (2016) (citations omit-
ted) (“[F]amilies with financial means and white families are far more likely to be left alone 
by the system despite experiencing the very same concerns that lead to child welfare interven-
tion for low-income families of color, such as mental illness, alcoholism, recreational or ha-
bitual drug use, or domestic violence.”). 
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child welfare system. It specifically focuses on the common practice of 
removing children from their parents while home on “trial discharge,” 
when families reunite after children were in foster care.19 Presently, New 
York State law requires some sort of hearing whenever a child is removed 
from her home, except for when a child is removed on trial discharge sta-
tus.20 The government can remove a child on trial discharge without any 
judicial oversight. This lack of due process is unconstitutional and is con-
trary to the New York Legislature’s commitment to keep families to-
gether, except when a child’s safety is at risk.21 This Note fills a gap in 
legal scholarship on the child welfare system, as child removals during 
trial discharge have been overlooked. 
Focusing on New York, this Note asserts that a parent is entitled to 
a hearing whenever the government removes her child from her care, even 
when her child is home on trial discharge status. Part I of this Note de-
scribes the harm that children experience when the government removes 
them from their families. Part II explains the basic path of a child neglect 
or abuse case in New York State, focusing on the varying levels of due 
process protections given to parents. Part III examines trial discharges, 
why the government removes children who are home on trial discharge, 
and what protections, or lack thereof, are available to families during a 
trial discharge. Finally, Part IV argues that the U.S. Constitution and New 
York State policy require an expedited hearing, based on imminent risk, 
whenever the government removes children on trial discharge. 
A change is urgently needed to stop the unnecessary trauma that the 
government inflicts on families, and to provide parents with recourse 
when the government removes a child during a trial discharge. Recently, 
a Bronx Family Court judge reunited two children with their father after 
they were removed from him during a trial discharge and separated for 
around eight months, during which time one child was crying and wetting 
the bed every night.22 The judge reinstated the trial discharge, demonstrat-
ing that the children should not have been removed in the first place.23 
Without the right to a hearing, the family was unable to reunite until 
 
 19 Trial discharge is a legal status where children in foster care are living at home with 
their parents on a trial basis, with the hope of remaining home permanently. See N.Y. FAM. 
CT. ACT §§ 1055(b)(i)(E), 1089(d)(2)(viii)(C) (McKinney 2018). 
 20 See infra Part II.B. for an example of one type of pre–trial removal hearing. See infra 
Part III.D. for a discussion of a parent’s legal rights when her child is removed during a trial 
discharge. 
 21 Matter of Marino S. Jr., 100 N.Y.2d 361, 372 (2003) (“It has long been the public 
policy of this State to keep biological families together . . . .”). See infra Part IV.A. for this 
Note’s argument for increased due process protections. 
 22 Matter of W. at *6 (N.Y. Family Ct. Bronx Cty. 2018) (on file with author). 
 23 See id. at *7. 
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months after the children were removed from the home. Hidden family 
separations, like this one, continue to occur without judicial oversight—
courts should afford the maximum amount of judicial review to any re-
moval of a child from her mother, her father, her neighborhood, her 
school, and everything that is familiar to her. 
I.   FAMILY SEPARATION TRAUMATIZES CHILDREN AND THEIR PARENTS 
A. Removing a Child from Her Parent Harms the Child 
A removal deprives a child of stable connections to her parent, her 
family, and her other community contacts.24 In fact, research overwhelm-
ingly demonstrates the harmful and emotionally damaging effects of re-
moving children from their parents or primary caregivers.25 The scope of 
trauma is even more expansive if a child’s extended family is unavailable 
to care for her, since she is then placed into foster care with strangers.26 
In another case in the Bronx, police and child welfare workers arrived at 
a mother’s home in the middle of the night to take her five children 
away.27 All five children, who had been previously taken into foster care, 
grabbed onto their mother’s body to resist being taken from her.28 One of 
the children was taken to the hospital and medicated to be calmed down.29 
This snapshot of a child removal demonstrates how family separations 
traumatize children. 
 
 24 Vivek S. Sankaran & Christopher Church, Easy Come, Easy Go: The Plight of Children 
Who Spend Less Than Thirty Days in Foster Care, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 207, 211 
(2016). 
 25 See, e.g., Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency 
Removal in Child Protective Proceedings, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 457, 459 (2003) (“Members of 
affected families may suffer enduring harm psychologically, financially, and in countless other 
ways from the stresses of removal and its aftermath (leading to divorce, job loss, etc.)”); Steph-
anie Clifford & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Foster Care as Punishment: The New Reality of 
‘Jane Crow’, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/6A3T-WPLH (discussing research 
that children removed and sent to foster care had higher delinquency rates, higher teen 
birthrates, a higher likelihood of going to prison as an adult, and lower earnings). 
 26 See generally Nicholas Lovett & Yuhan Xue, Family First or the Kindness of 
Strangers? Foster Care Placements and Adult Outcomes (2018), https://perma.cc/X99L-2E9F 
(finding that foster youth who lived with family have better outcomes in adulthood, as com-
pared to foster youth who lived with strangers). Many people in the child welfare field use the 
term “non-kinship foster care” to refer to stranger foster care; in contrast, “kinship foster care” 
is when a child is placed with a relative. Interview with Erin Cloud, Supervising Att’y, Family 
Def. Practice, The Bronx Defs., in Long Island City, N.Y. (May 3, 2018). The use of “stranger 
foster care” in this Note is intentional to avoid sugar-coating the reality that many children in 
foster care are living with people who are complete strangers to them. 
 27 Crystal Baker-Burr, When Protection Hurts, MEDIUM (Sept. 12, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/Z475-R8UU. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
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Studies show that children who are raised in institutions, such as fos-
ter care, experience decreased gray matter in their brains, exhibit higher 
incidence of psychosocial disorders, and have more difficulty developing 
social relationships.30 Notably, researchers have found that the psycho-
logical damage inflicted on children who are forcibly removed from their 
parent is often irreversible.31 In addition, children placed in stranger foster 
care face higher risks of physical abuse than other children, in addition to 
emotional and medical neglect.32 After exiting foster care, children face 
higher teen birth rates, lower salaries, and a higher likelihood of home-
lessness.33 
B.   Removing a Child from His Parent Has Long-Term Consequences 
for Families and Impacted Communities  
Child removals cause harm not only to the individual children, but 
also to their families and their communities. Placing children in foster 
care, even for a short period of time, damages parent-child relationships.34 
For instance, a child may lose respect for her parent, and in turn, a parent 
may lose the ability to effectively discipline and guide his child.35 In ad-
dition, the entire community experiences the system’s long-lasting im-
pacts, specifically in neighborhoods where a child welfare agency moni-
tors many families or where families have children in foster care.36 For 
 
 30 Nathan A. Fox et al., The Effects of Psychosocial Deprivation on Attachment: Lessons 
from the Bucharest Early Intervention Project, 45 PSYCHODYNAMIC PSYCHIATRY 441, 442 
(2017) (citations omitted); see generally Erin Kim Hazen, Youth in Foster Care: An Exami-
nation of Social, Mental, and Physical Risks, N.Y.U. DEP’T APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY, 
https://perma.cc/M7WA-ZSWX (last visited Nov. 4, 2018) (describing the social, mental 
health, and physical health risks that foster care youth face). 
 31 See Wan, supra note 7. 
 32 See Kathleen B. Simon, Note, Catalyzing the Separation of Black Families: A Critique 
of Foster Care Placements Without Prior Judicial Review, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 347, 
364 (2018) (citing Chill, supra note 25, at 459); NAT’L COAL. FOR CHILD PROT. REFORM, 
FOSTER CARE VS. FAMILY PRESERVATION: THE TRACK RECORD ON SAFETY AND WELL-BEING 2 
(2015). 
 33 Ketteringham et al., Healthy Mothers, Healthy Babies, supra note 17, at 99 (citing Jo-
seph J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of Foster 
Care, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1583, 1584 (2007) and Patrick J. Fowler et al., Pathways to and 
from Homelessness and Associated Psychosocial Outcomes Among Adolescents Leaving the 
Foster Care System, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1453 (2009)). 
 34 See Sankaran & Church, supra note 24, at 210-13; see also Miriam Jordan, A Migrant 
Boy Rejoins His Mother, but He’s Not the Same, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/3L5R-W328 (describing the challenges of immigrant families who were reu-
nited after being forcibly separated at the U.S.-Mexico border). 
 35 Ketteringham et al., Healthy Mothers, Healthy Babies, supra note 17, at 102; Roberts, 
Racial Geography, supra note 13, at 133-36. 
 36 Dorothy E. Roberts, The Community Dimension of State Child Protection, 34 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 23, 30-31 (2005). 
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example, participants in a Chicago research study reported that a strong 
child welfare presence in their neighborhood has created, among other 
things, distrust among neighbors.37 
More broadly, child removals take away family integrity, an essen-
tial component of healthy communities, from Black, Brown, and poor 
communities, since a high number of their children are removed and 
placed in foster care.38 The high level of child welfare involvement, in 
turn, weakens Black, Brown, and poor communities’ personal identity, as 
well as their collective economic and political power.39 The result is the 
perpetuation of institutionalized discrimination against people of color 
and poor people, and the paternal relationship between the government 
and marginalized people.40 
The government inflicts permanent harm whenever it removes a 
child. Although the trauma may be different in distinct circumstances, 
every separation of a child from her parent is damaging.41 The global up-
roar over the 2018 border separations was due, in part, to a recognition 
that the children were suffering as a result. We must equally protest the 
ongoing suffering of children across the United States, who are taken 
from their parents every single day.42 
II. THE BASIC PATH OF NEW YORK CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 
To understand the injustice that children face while on trial discharge 
status, it is necessary to have a basic grasp of the path of an abuse or 
neglect case in New York State, and of what due process is available to 
families when a child is removed at other points in a case. Since a trial 
discharge only occurs after a court finds a parent neglectful, this Part will 
explain the procedural context leading up to a finding of neglect being 
entered against a parent. 
 
 37 Roberts, Racial Geography, supra note 13, at 138-41 (discussing a research study with 
twenty-five Black women in Woodlawn, a neighborhood with one of the highest rates of foster 
care placements in Chicago). 
 38 See Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, supra note 11, at 179 (“Family integrity 
is crucial to group welfare because of the role parents and other relatives play in transmitting 
survival skills, values, and self-esteem to the next generation.”); see infra note 179 & 180 for 
findings regarding racial disproportionality in the foster care system. 
 39 See Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, supra note 11, at 179. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See, e.g., Doyle, supra note 33, at 1602 (presenting research findings that suggest that 
children who were “on the margin” of either being removed to foster care or remaining at 
home fared better when they remained home). 
 42 Paul Chill, Hundreds of U.S. Children Taken From Home, HARTFORD COURANT (June 
25, 2018, 4:50 PM), (stating that 700 to 800 child removals occur throughout the United States 
every day). 
2019] SEPARATING FAMILIES WITHOUT DUE PROCESS 11 
The Administration for Children’s Services (ACS), New York City’s 
child protective agency, has a broad reach, performing over 57,000 inves-
tigations in 2016 and over 55,000 investigations in 2017.43 Private foster 
care agencies contract with ACS and New York State to provide care for 
children in foster care.44 Foster care agencies must work towards reunifi-
cation of the family, if possible, and are responsible for caring for the 
child until reunification, adoption, or another permanent plan comes to 
fruition.45 
A. How Does an Abuse or Neglect Case Begin? 
Anyone can call the State Central Register (SCR) abuse and neglect 
hotline to report a concern and to initiate a case,46 allowing people to eas-
ily manipulate the process.47 ACS will investigate the report and then de-
cide whether the family needs court intervention.48 Whether or not court 
intervention is needed depends on the ACS worker’s judgment of the se-
riousness and the credibility of the allegations, and the parent’s willing-
ness to agree to services (e.g., drug treatment, mental health services) to 
 
 43 JILL RIVERA GREENE ET AL., CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, ASSESSMENT OF NEW YORK 
CITY ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES SAFETY PRACTICE AND INITIATIVES: KEY 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2017) (2016 statistics); N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN’S 
SERVS., CHILD WELFARE INDICATORS ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2017) (2017 statistics). 
 44 N.Y. OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, REPORT 2016-N-2, HEALTH & SAFETY OF 
CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 5 (2018). 
 45 See Nell Clement, Note, Do “Reasonable Efforts” Require Cultural Competence? The 
Importance of Culturally Competent Reunification Services in the California Child Welfare 
System, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 397, 403-08 (2008) (describing federal law’s de-
velopment in requiring foster care agencies to make reasonable efforts to keep families to-
gether). 
 46 The Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment, OFFICE OF CHILD. & 
FAMILY SERVS., https://perma.cc/4ARK-TFPG (last visited Dec. 30, 2018) (stating that the 
SCR receives calls 24 hours a day from mandated reporters and non-mandated reporters, in-
cluding the public). 
 47 See Roberts, Racial Geography, supra note 13, at 140 (describing how some partici-
pants in the study discussed community members using the child abuse reporting process as 
retaliation against their neighbors); Rebecca Klein & Caroline Preston, When Schools Use 
Child Protective Services as a Weapon Against Parents, HECHINGER REP., 
https://perma.cc/M3L6-TZP4 (describing how school officials threaten to report parents to 
child welfare services as a way to coerce parents into following the school’s advice). 
 48 Once a report of suspected child neglect or abuse is received, ACS must investigate the 
allegations pursuant to N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424(6) (McKinney 2018) and deem the report 
“indicated” or “unfounded” within 60 days. Id. § 424(7). Racial disparities permeate this initial 
stage of the reporting process. For example, in New York State, twice as many Black children 
as white children were reported to the State Central Register in 2009. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE 
OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., OVERVIEW: DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY REPRESENTATION 
(DMR) IN OCFS SERVICE DELIVERY 1 (2009), https://perma.cc/XC29-CEJG. 
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improve the alleged concerns.49 If ACS workers decide that court inter-
vention is needed, they meet with ACS lawyers to file a petition against 
the parent in family court.50 Article 10 of the Family Court Act is the 
governing law and defines abuse and neglect.51 This set of laws intends 
to be rehabilitative instead of punitive, as a family court case aims to pro-
mote the best outcomes for the families involved.52 
Unfortunately, what constitutes neglect is subjective and has a broad 
definition.53 Judges often make disparate findings of neglect; the system 
overlooks the behavior of middle-class parents, but scrutinizes the same 
behavior of low-income parents.54 Additionally, family court judges, who 
hold the power to decide the outcomes of a case, overwhelmingly come 
from different backgrounds than the parents to whom they are assigned.55 
 
 49 See Mulzer & Urs, supra note 18, at 30 (explaining how child welfare workers use the 
threat of filing a case in court to pressure parents to agree to participate in service programs); 
see also SOC. SERV. § 424(11). 
 50 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1032(a) (McKinney 2018). 
 51 “[A] ‘[n]eglected child’ [is] a child less than eighteen years of age whose physical, 
mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming im-
paired as a result of the failure of his parent or other person legally responsible for his care to 
exercise a minimum degree of care in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter 
or education . . . or medical, dental, optometrical or surgical care, though financially able to 
do so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so . . . .” Id. § 1012(f)(i)(A). “[An] 
‘[a]bused child’ [is] a child less than eighteen years of age whose parent or other person legally 
responsible or his care inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon such child actual injury by other 
than accidental means which causes or creates a substantial risk of death . . . [or] creates or 
allows to be created a substantial risk of injury to such child by other than accidental means 
which would be likely to cause death or serious protracted disfigurement, or protracted im-
pairment of physical or emotional health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of 
any bodily organ . . . .” Id. § 1012(e)(i)(ii). 
 52 See People v. Roselle, 84 N.Y.2d 350, 355 (1994) (“The orientation of Family Court is 
rehabilitative, directed at protecting the vulnerable child, as distinct from the penal nature of 
a criminal action which aims to assess blame for a wrongful act and punish the offender.”); 
Jane M. Spinak, Judicial Leadership in Family Court: A Cautionary Tale, 10 TENN. J.L. & 
POL’Y 47, 78-79 (2014) (stating that therapeutic court intervention improves the outcomes for 
families). Whether the coercive nature of family court proceedings lend themselves to “reha-
bilitation” is a matter for debate, however. See id. at 78-82. 
 53 See Candra Bullock, Comment, Low-Income Parents Victimized by Child Protective 
Services, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1023, 1042 (2003) (arguing that federal, state, 
and local child abuse and neglect definitions are ambiguous, resulting in unnecessary removals 
of children in poor families). 
 54 See ABIGAIL KRAMER, THE NEW SCH.: CTR. FOR N.Y.C. AFFAIRS, IS REFORM FINALLY 
COMING TO NEW YORK CITY FAMILY COURT? 3 [hereinafter KRAMER, IS REFORM FINALLY 
COMING] (describing that many child protective cases in family court involve behaviors that 
likely go unnoticed in middle-class families who have less contact with public institutions); 
see also Emma S. Ketteringham, Live in a Poor Neighborhood? Better Be a Perfect Parent, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/RKH2-TLKT. 
 55 Family court judges are typically white and/or upper middle class, while the families 
before them are disproportionately from underserved communities of color. Cloud et al., supra 
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Furthermore, the New York City Mayor appoints the family court 
judges.56 Since the people do not elect the family court judges, it is less 
likely that a parent will be assigned a judge from her own community. As 
such, what many judges perceive to be neglect, based on their own expe-
riences, is completely different in light of the complex challenges that the 
parents in their courtrooms face every day. 
B.   A Parent’s Rights When the Government Removes Her Child Before 
Trial Is Complete 
When ACS files a petition against a parent, it can ask the family court 
judge to approve removing a child from her home.57 ACS also has the 
power to remove a child from her home in emergencies, even before filing 
a petition in family court.58 In fact, ACS can remove a child from her 
home at any stage of a court proceeding without prior judicial approval.59 
Whenever ACS removes a child without judicial approval before a trial is 
completed, however, it must come to court on the next business day for a 
post-removal review.60 
The procedural posture of a case at the time of a removal—essen-
tially, whether or not a judge has found the parent neglectful—will inform 
what type of judicial review the removal will receive, the timing of that 
judicial review, and the legal standards that the judge will apply when 
reviewing ACS’s removal decision. Although the child, her family, and 
the wider community will always experience trauma from her removal, 
the posture of a family court case traditionally determines the amount of 
due process that a parent and a child subsequently receive to challenge 
the removal. 
 
note 13, at 83 (citation omitted) (stating that mainly white judges oversee family court cases); 
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE FOR JUST. INITIATIVES, SELF-REPRESENTED 
LITIGANTS IN THE N.Y.C. FAMILY COURT AND N.Y.C. HOUSING COURT, SERVICES FOR THE 
SELF-REPRESENTED IN THE TOWN AND VILLAGE COURTS 3-5 (2005) (describing the results of 
an informal survey about self-represented litigants in Family Court; none of the users identi-
fied themselves as white, and 83% reported household incomes under $30,000 annually); see 
Amy Sinden, “Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?”: A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare 
Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 352 (1999) (noting that the majority of the actors 
in the child welfare system are well-educated, middle-class, and white, while most of the ac-
cused parents are members of poor communities of color). 
 56 See FAM. CT. § 123. 
 57 Id. § 1027(a)(iii). 
 58 Id. § 1024(a). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. § 1027(a)(i). At any point in the proceeding, judges can also order a hearing on their 
own accord to determine whether a child should be removed from their home, where certain 
findings have been made. Id. § 1027(a)(iii). 
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The current practice dictates that a family receives the highest level 
of due process at the beginning stages of a case—a parent has a statutory 
right to an emergency hearing when his child is removed.61 A parent has 
the right to hold an emergency hearing consecutively, on a daily basis, 
until a judge can determine whether or not there is an imminent risk of 
harm.62 In family court, due to overcrowded court calendars, a case typi-
cally appears in front of a judge for only 30 minutes.63 Therefore, a hear-
ing with three witnesses—that might take only three or four hours to com-
plete—will be spread out over several weeks, or even several months. In 
an emergency hearing, ACS must show that the child would be in immi-
nent risk of harm if she remained with her parent.64 In determining 
whether imminent risk exists, a judge will consider ways to mitigate the 
risk of harm and the harmful impact that the removal would have on the 
child.65 
In contrast to the beginning of a case, a parent does not have the same 
right to a hearing, let alone an emergency hearing, when ACS removes 
his child during a trial discharge.66 
C. What Occurs at a Trial in an Abuse or Neglect Case 
A parent’s due process rights when the government takes her child 
are dependent on whether or not a trial on the allegations in the petition is 
completed. A parent only has a right to challenge a removal in an emer-
gency hearing, as described above, before a judge makes a finding of 
 
 61 See FAM. CT. §§ 1027(a)-(b), 1028(a). A child also has the right to an emergency hear-
ing when she is removed from home, prior to her parent being adjudicated as neglectful. See 
id. § 1027(a)(ii). 
 62 Id. §§ 1027, 1028(a). 
 63 See KRAMER, IS REFORM FINALLY COMING, supra note 54, at 3 (describing that high 
caseloads in family courts often mean judges have multiple hearings scheduled for the same 
30-minute time slot). 
 64 See FAM. CT. § 1027(b)(i) (“[I]f the court finds that removal is necessary to avoid im-
minent risk to the child’s life or health, it shall remove or continue the removal of the child.”); 
Id. § 1028(a) (“[T]he court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the child should be re-
turned [home] . . . . Upon such hearing, the court shall grant the application [for return], unless 
it finds that the return presents an imminent risk to the child’s life or health.”). 
 65 Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 378-79 (2004) (explaining that the court must 
determine, in the factual setting before it, whether the imminent risk of harm to the child can 
be eliminated by other means, such as issuing an order of protection for the child or for one 
parent against another parent). 
 66 See infra Part III.D. for a discussion about a parent’s lack of due process rights after a 
child is removed from her home while on trial discharge. 
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abuse or neglect against the parent.67 A judge is the fact-finder and con-
ducts all trials in family court, through a bench trial.68 ACS has the burden 
to prove their allegations against the parent at trial.69 If ACS presents suf-
ficient evidence at trial, the judge will make a finding of neglect against 
the parent.70 
D. Disposition: The Plan for the Rest of the Case 
If a judge makes a finding of abuse or neglect against a parent, the 
judge must then hold a hearing to determine what the dispositional order 
should be.71 The parties can either contest the hearing or agree to it.72 At 
a dispositional hearing, the standard of review shifts from the imminent 
risk standard to the lower best interest of the child standard, which re-
mains the standard for the duration of the case.73 The best interest of the 
child standard is not clearly defined and lacks concrete guidance, giving 
the judge broad discretion in her decisions.74 The vagueness and the sub-
jectivity of the standard inevitably results in racial and class bias perme-
ating what is deemed to be in the child’s best interests.75 
 
 67 MERRIL SOBIE, SUPPLEMENTARY PRACTICE COMMENTARIES, McKinney’s Cons. Laws 
of N.Y., Book 29A, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1028 (2010) (“[A § 1028 hearing] may be requested 
up to the time the issue of abuse or neglect has been adjudicated . . . .”) (alterations in original). 
 68 Josh Gupta-Kagan, Filling the Due Process Donut Hole: Abuse and Neglect Cases Be-
tween Disposition and Permanency, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 13, 16 (2010). 
 69 Nicholson, 3 N.Y.3d at 368 (citations omitted) (“[A] party seeking to establish neglect 
must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, first, that a child’s physical, mental or emo-
tional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired and second, 
that the actual or threatened harm to the child is a consequence of the failure of the parent or 
caretaker to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child with proper supervision 
or guardianship.”). 
 70 Unfortunately, judges admit making findings of neglect against parents even when 
ACS has not presented sufficient evidence. SPECIAL WELFARE ADVISORY PANEL, ANNIE E. 
CASEY FOUND., ADVISORY REPORT ON FRONT LINE AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICE 48 (2000) (de-
scribing a researcher’s discussions with family court judges who described failing to rule 
against ACS even when it presented weak cases, out of fear of being blamed for a later harm 
to the child). 
 71 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 1047(a), 1052(a)(i)-(vii) (McKinney 2018). 
 72 Interview with Erin Cloud, supra note 26. 
 73 Telephone Interview with Keith Baumann, Supervising Att’y, Family Def. Practice, 
The Bronx Defs. (Aug. 2, 2018); FAM. CT. § 1052(b)(i)(A) (stating that a dispositional order 
regarding a child’s placement must determine whether continuation in the home would be 
contrary to the child’s best interests). 
 74 See John Thomas Halloran, Families First: Reframing Parental Rights as Familial 
Rights in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 51, 
67-68 (2014) (discussing a prominent critique of the subjective best interest of the child stand-
ard); Sinden, supra note 55, at 354 (“[T]he ‘best interests of the child’ . . . is an extremely 
malleable and subjective standard.”). 
 75 Sinden, supra note 55, at 384 (citations omitted). See infra note 179 & 180 for schol-
arship on how racism impacts a child protective proceeding. 
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1. The Court May Order the Parent to Participate in Services or 
Be Supervised 
One purpose of the dispositional order is to articulate the steps that a 
parent must take to “fix” the problem that led to the neglect.76 For exam-
ple, if ACS alleges that a parent has neglected his child by using drugs, a 
judge would consider whether the parent is involved in a drug treatment 
program when crafting the dispositional order. The parent is expected to 
complete these rehabilitative steps within the specified period of supervi-
sion.77 
2. The Child’s Legal Status: A Release Versus a Trial Discharge 
The second purpose of the dispositional order is to determine where 
the child will live,78 which will dictate whether or not a judge will review 
the government’s decision to remove a child from her home. New York 
law strongly presumes that remaining with or returning to her parent is in 
a child’s best interest.79 There are two main possibilities for where a child 
will live: foster care or “release” to the parent.80 A release means that a 
 
 76 See 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.83 (2018), for possible conditions 
that can be included in a dispositional order. A family court judge’s capacity to craft disposi-
tional orders that respond to an individual family’s needs fits with the rehabilitative purpose 
of the Family Court Act. See Jane M. Spinak, Family Defense and the Disappearing Problem-
Solving Court, 20 CUNY L. REV. 171, 174-75 (2016) (outlining the family court’s develop-
ment as an alternative to the punitive criminal court system, and adopting a problem-solving 
approach to meet an individual family’s needs); see also People v. Roselle, 84 N.Y.2d 350, 
354-55 (1994) (“The orientation of Family Court is rehabilitative, directed at protecting the 
vulnerable child . . . .”). 
 77 See FAM. CT. § 1057(d) (“The duration of any period of . . . supervision of the respond-
ent or respondents . . . shall be for an initial period of no more than one year.”). The outcome 
of a case is often conditioned on a parent’s involvement and compliance with services. See 
Mulzer & Urs, supra note 18, at 33 (“[P]arents can agree to participate in any services, even 
without a finding of abuse or neglect, as part of an agreement to keep or bring their child home 
or to improve the likelihood of a favorable resolution.”). Thus, even before an abuse or neglect 
determination is ever made, the state can exercise a high level of control over families through 
the child welfare system. Interview with Erin Cloud, supra note 26. 
 78 FAM. CT. § 1052 (listing possible placement options that a judge can order for the child 
at disposition). 
 79 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(1)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2018) (“[I]t is generally desirable 
for the child to remain with or be returned to the birth parent because the child’s need for a 
normal family life will usually best be met in the home of its birth parent . . . .”); Matter of 
Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d 299, 309 (1992) (quoting SOC. SERV. § 384-b(1)(a)(i)-(ii)) (“[T]he Leg-
islature has found and declared that a child’s need to grow up with a ‘normal family life in a 
permanent home’ is ordinarily best met in the child’s ‘natural home.’”). 
 80 Technically, the dispositional options for a child’s status are more complicated: the 
judge could release a child to a respondent parent pursuant to FAM. CT. § 1057(a), release a 
child to a non-respondent parent pursuant to FAM. CT. § 1054(a), place a child with a relative 
pursuant to FAM. CT. § 1055(a) (called a ‘direct placement’ in practice), place a child in foster 
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child will live with her parent while ACS supervises the family; there is 
no foster care.81 If a child is removed while on release to the parent, the 
government must seek judicial approval.82 By contrast, if the dispositional 
order places a child in foster care, the foster care agency supervises the 
family.83 A child in foster care usually comes home via a trial discharge, 
rather than a direct release to the parent.84 If the government removes a 
child on trial discharge status, it does not need to seek judicial approval. 
Therefore, parents currently have different due process rights depending 
on the legal status of their child after disposition—release or trial dis-
charge. Regardless of a child’s dispositional status, however, the trauma 
remains the same whenever a child is removed. A comparison of two hy-
pothetical family court cases will help illustrate these options. 
In one hypothetical case, ACS removes Jonathan from his mother 
Melissa, and places him in foster care.85 ACS removed Jonathan, in part, 
because Melissa was homeless. Melissa’s case drags on, but she is ulti-
mately found guilty of neglect, and her dispositional hearing is held on 
May 1st. In the time between Jonathan’s initial removal and her disposi-
tional hearing, Melissa manages to secure stable housing with space for 
 
care pursuant to FAM. CT. ACT § 1055(a), or grant custody to a respondent parent or another 
relative or suitable person pursuant to FAM. CT. § 1055-b(a). 
 81 FAM. CT. §§ 1054, 1057. 
 82 Removal would change the child’s legal status, as determined in the dispositional order; 
thus, the government would need to modify that court order. Id. § 1061 (allowing the court, 
or any party, by motion, to modify or to vacate a court order with good cause). 
 83 See id. § 1055(a)(ii). 
 84 Telephone Interview with Keith Baumann, supra note 73. In some cases, a child may 
return home from foster care through a final discharge, which requires court permission and 
skips a trial discharge altogether; this is less common. Id.; see FAM. CT. §§ 1055(b)(i)(E), 
1089(d)(2)(viii)(C). 
 85 Jonathan’s placement in foster care starts the clock for the foster care agency to seek 
termination of Melissa’s parental rights to Jonathan under the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
(“ASFA”) of 1997, Pub. L. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2118 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). Under federal law, a foster care agency may file to terminate a parent’s 
rights (often called the “civil death penalty”) once his child has been in foster care for 15 of 
the most recent 22 months. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2018); see Elizabeth Mills Viney, Com-
ment, The Right to Counsel in Parental-Rights Termination Cases: How a Clear and Con-
sistent Legal Standard Would Better Protect Indigent Families, 63 SMU L. REV. 1403, 1406 
(2010) (“[P]arental rights termination-often called ‘the civil death penalty’ due to its perma-
nence.”) (citation omitted). For more information on the critiques of ASFA, see Chris Gottlieb, 
The Lessons of Mass Incarceration for Child Welfare, AMSTERDAM NEWS (Feb. 1, 2018, 9:28 
AM), http://perma.cc/Y5XV-ZUGN (asserting that, under ASFA, the United States is the only 
country that forces adoptions of children whose biological parents desperately want to care 
for them) and Christina White, Federally Mandated Destruction of the Black Family: The 
Adoption and Safe Families, 1 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 303, 303 (2006) (“With black children 
representing an overwhelming percentage of the foster care population, the ASFA represents 
federally mandated destruction of black families.”). 
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Jonathan. At the dispositional hearing, the judge enters Jonathan’s dispo-
sitional status as a release, allowing Jonathan to go home with his mother 
Melissa. Five months later, when Melissa is evicted from her home, ACS 
seeks to remove Jonathan from his mother again. Since Jonathan’s legal 
status is a release, ACS would need to seek a court order to modify the 
dispositional order for the removal.86 This scenario provides Melissa with 
some judicial process to argue that her son Jonathan should stay at home 
with her. The judge would be able to examine ACS’s reasons for remov-
ing Jonathan from Melissa and to determine whether there are any sup-
portive options available that would allow Jonathan to stay home with his 
mother. 
In another hypothetical case involving similar facts, ACS removes 
Jonathan from Melissa, and places him in foster care. Melissa’s assigned 
family court judge happens to have a light calendar, and, after a short trial, 
finds her guilty of neglect. Her dispositional hearing is held on February 
1st. Melissa has not yet been able to secure stable housing, so the judge 
decides that Jonathan must temporarily remain in foster care. Three 
months later, on May 1st, after working with the foster care agency to find 
a home where she and Jonathan can live, the foster care agency allows 
Jonathan to go home to Melissa on a trial discharge. Five months later, 
Melissa is evicted from her home. The foster care agency removes Jona-
than from Melissa through a “failed” trial discharge, without notice, a 
court order, or a subsequent hearing.87 As a result, unless Melissa’s law-
yer files creative motions to request some sort of a hearing to review this 
removal, and a judge grants such request, Melissa and Jonathan will need 
to wait until the next scheduled permanency hearing (discussed in the next 
section) to ask the judge to return Jonathan home. 
As these hypothetical situations illustrate, a variety of factors con-
tribute to determining a child’s legal status at disposition. In spite of this, 
the amount of due process that a parent receives to challenge the removal 
of her child is drastically different simply based on her child’s legal status 
at disposition. A judge should be required to review every decision to re-
move a child from her parent, regardless of the child’s legal status at dis-
position. 
 
 86 FAM. CT. § 1061 (allowing the court or any party, by motion, to modify or vacate a 
court order showing good cause). 
 87 See infra note 100 for further detail. 
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E. While a Child Is in Foster Care, a Permanency Hearing Is Held 
Every Six Months 
After a judge enters a dispositional order, the case will come back 
for a review every six months if a child is placed in foster care.88 This six-
month review is called a “permanency hearing.”89 At this hearing, a judge 
must decide, among other things, whether it is safe for a child to return 
home to her parent or whether there are ongoing safety concerns that ne-
cessitate a child to remain in foster care.90 Permanency hearings continue 
until a child reaches “permanency,” whether that means returning to her 
parent, being adopted, or attaining other forms of permanency.91 
III. TRIAL DISCHARGE: A CHILD IN FOSTER CARE IS HOME ON A TRIAL 
BASIS 
A. What is a Trial Discharge? 
Now that the basic process of an abuse or neglect case has been ex-
plained, this Part will focus on the Note’s central argument: that parents 
of children removed on trial discharge should receive the same protec-
tions as they do when their children are removed pre-disposition. The 
Family Court Act defines a trial discharge as when “the child is physically 
returned to the parent while the child remains in the care and custody of 
the local social services district.”92 The statute contains little else regard-
ing what this definition means.93 Nevertheless, the distinction between the 
 
 88 FAM. CT. § 1089(a). 
 89 Id. § 1086 (“The purpose of this article is to establish uniform procedures for perma-
nency hearings for all children who are placed in foster care . . . . It is meant to provide chil-
dren placed out of their homes timely and effective judicial review that promotes permanency, 
safety and well-being in their lives.”). 
 90 See id. § 1089(d) (requiring the court, at the conclusion of a permanency hearing, to 
make findings in accordance with the best interests and the safety of the child, including 
whether the child would be at risk of abuse or neglect if returned to his parent). At a perma-
nency hearing, a foster care agency must also show what “reasonable efforts” it has made to 
facilitate the family’s reunification, usually focusing on what service referrals it has made for 
the parent. See id. § 1089(d)(2)(iii). Whether judges hold foster care agencies responsible for 
their duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify families is questionable. See Sankaran & 
Church, supra note 24, at 227 (summarizing various reports that judges rarely find that a foster 
care agency did not make reasonable efforts). 
 91 FAM. CT. § 1088 (“[Once a child is placed in foster care] the case shall remain on the 
court’s calendar and the court shall maintain jurisdiction over the case until the child is dis-
charged from placement . . . .”). 
 92 Id. §§ 1055(b)(i)(E), 1089(d)(2)(viii)(C). 
 93 The legislative history for the statutory sections defining a trial discharge provides little 
insight. See, e.g., S.B. 5805, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); N.Y. Bill Jacket, Budget 
Report on Bills, S.B. 8435, ch. 437, 2006 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2006) (“[P]rovide clarification that 
a district maintains custody of the child during the trial discharge period.”). Courts that cite 
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foster care agency’s legal custody and the parent’s physical custody of a 
child results in parents having no recourse when their child is removed 
during a trial discharge.94 
When a foster care agency is satisfied that a parent has progressed, 
that agency may decide that it is in the child’s best interests to trial dis-
charge her back home.95 The foster care agency exercises wide discretion 
over when, and how, to trial discharge a child home.96 A trial discharge 
allows children to return home on a trial basis, while the foster care 
agency continues to supervise and service the family.97 Therefore, the 
family can reunite, while being monitored by the foster care agency with-
out disruption. 
A foster care agency will set conditions that a parent must agree to 
follow to keep her child at home on a trial discharge status. These condi-
tions may or may not be relevant to the safety of the child, and may in-
clude: completing certain services (such as therapy or parenting classes), 
ensuring that the child attends school regularly, staying up to date with 
the child’s medical needs, and maintaining regular contact with the foster 
care agency.98 Although these conditions are undeniably important for a 
 
this definition of a trial discharge do not further explain the definition’s meaning. See, e.g., 
Matter of Nicole A., 40 Misc. 3d 254, 260 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Bronx. Cty. 2013); Matter of Chris-
topher G., 82 A.D.3d 1549, 1551 n.2 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (citations omitted). 
 94 See Matter of Nicole A., 40 Misc. 3d at 260 (“With a trial discharge, the agency can 
remove the children from their mother’s physical custody at any time cause warrants it, with-
out [granting a parent] the full degree of legal process required if she were to have legal cus-
tody.”). The court’s language indicates that a parent’s lack of legal custody over her child 
permits the foster care agency to remove a child on trial discharge status without judicial ap-
proval; the foster care agency has legal custody over the child, irrespective of the child phys-
ically residing at home. 
 95 Foster care agencies have discretion to return a child home on trial discharge, unless 
the family court has prohibited it. FAM. CT. § 1089(d)(2)(viii)(C); Matter of Christopher G., 
82 A.D.3d at 1551. There are no set time frames for a trial discharge, but six to eight months 
is typical. E-mail from Noemi Cotto, Soc. Work Supervisor, Family Def. Practice, The Bronx 
Defs., to author (Sept. 13, 2018, 3:27 PM) (on file with author). 
 96 See FAM. CT. §§ 1055(b)(i)(E), 1089(d)(2)(viii)(C). What happens when a judge be-
lieves a child should be trial discharged home but a foster care agency disagrees? The answer 
is not so clear. Currently, judges interpret their power to order a trial discharge differently. 
Telephone Interview with Keith Baumann, supra note 73; see Matter of Nicole A., 40 Misc. 
3d at 262 (“[T]he agency nevertheless argues that the court does not have the authority to order 
a trial discharge . . . .”). In Matter of Nicole A., the judge determined that “the Family Court 
has implicit and inherent authority to direct a trial discharge.” Id. at 264. 
 97 See Matter of Nicole A., 40 Misc. 3d at 260. 
 98 E-mail from Noemi Cotto, supra note 95; see, e.g., Matter of Admin. for Children’s 
Servs. v. Sonia R., 30 Misc. 3d 1211(A), at *6 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Bronx. Cty. 2010) (outlining 
the family court judge’s ordered trial discharge conditions, including requiring the parents to 
take random alcohol and drug tests, and test negative, to attend family therapy, to allow the 
agency to make random home visits, and to ensure the children regularly attend school and 
their medical appointments). 
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child’s well-being, in most cases, removing a child from his parent causes 
an even greater harm to the child than failing to fulfill a condition. 
B.   How and Why the Government Removes a Child During a Trial  
Discharge 
If all goes well, eventually, with a judge’s permission, the foster care 
agency will “final discharge” the child home, ending the agency’s legal 
custody of the child and a court’s jurisdiction over the family.99 A final 
discharge is the most desirable end for a family; however, the foster care 
agency may also remove the child from home, ending the trial discharge 
and foreclosing the possibility of a final discharge. This could occur if a 
parent does not follow the conditions of the trial discharge, or if the foster 
care agency has other concerns. The foster care agency can remove the 
child from her home without any judicial review.100 In other words, the 
foster care agency can remove a child without ever proving in court why 
the removal was needed, purely based on the agency’s independent feel-
ings or concerns. Judges, foster care agencies, and many practitioners re-
fer to this removal as a “failed trial discharge.”101 
The common reasons as to why foster care agencies remove children 
during trial discharge generally do not justify the trauma that a removal 
inflicts on children, and, thus, highlight the need for judicial review. Alt-
hough foster care agencies will almost always tie their reasoning to issues 
 
 99 Matter of Christopher G., 82 A.D.3d at 1551 (explaining that there is no statutory pro-
vision providing the agency with the discretion to end the trial discharge through a final dis-
charge without family court authorization). 
 100 Interview with Erin Cloud, supra note 26. ACS internal policies seem to indicate that 
foster care agencies are not required to provide notice to assigned counsel on the case when 
agencies have removed a child during a trial discharge. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN’S 
SERVS., CHILD WELFARE PROGRAMS’ INTEGRATED FAMILY TEAM CONFERENCE POLICY 14-16 
(2016) [hereinafter ACS, TEAM CONFERENCE POLICY]. ACS staff are required to notify an 
ACS lawyer when a Child Safety Conference (“CSC”) is held. Id. at 16. The policy specifies 
that an initial CSC meeting will be held “[w]hen a trial discharge fails” and when a new report 
is made to the State Central Register. Id. at 15. However, assigned counsel are often not noti-
fied when foster care agencies remove a child during a trial discharge. Interview with Erin 
Cloud, supra note 26. It is unclear whether ACS fails to notify counsel because a trail dis-
charge removal frequently does not coincide with a new SCR report and therefore a CSC 
would not be held, or because ACS is not following its own policy requirements. See ACS, 
TEAM CONFERENCE POLICY, supra, at 15-16.  
 101 See, e.g., Matter of Amarnee T.T., 140 A.D.3d 452, 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); Matter 
of Pauline Ameesha L., 291 A.D.2d 299, 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Matter of Leake & Watts 
Services, Inc., 51 Misc. 3d 1207(A), at *4 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2016); Sonia R., 30 
Misc. 3d 1211(A), at *6. Although a trial discharge is stated within the Family Court Act, a 
“failed” trial discharge is not mentioned in the statute; the statute does not identify a procedure 
to follow when a foster care agency removes a child during a trial discharge. See generally 
N.Y. FAM CT. ACT §§ 1055(b)(i)(E), 1089(d)(2)(viii)(C) (McKinney 2018). 
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of the child’s safety, in many cases, the agency’s claims about safety are 
debatable.102 A child on trial discharge is often removed for reasons re-
lated to the parent’s “non-compliance” with conditions of the trial dis-
charge, such as making the child’s medical appointments or maintaining 
stable housing, regardless of any actual safety concerns to the child.103 In 
fact, some foster care agency workers mistakenly believe that they are 
legally obligated to remove a child home on trial discharge if every con-
dition of a court order is not perfectly followed.104 The removal of a child 
solely because a parent did not follow one trial discharge condition con-
flicts with New York State’s own mandate to keep a child with his parent, 
except when the child is in danger,105 and causes irrevocable harm to a 
child.106 
In addition, some child removals occur because the agency has gen-
uine concerns about a child’s safety during a trial discharge. Even then, 
what foster care agency workers consider to be threatening to a child in 
the home often does not involve immediate danger to justify the trauma 
of removing a child from her home. Ultimately, due to the absence of 
judicial review under the current practice, there is no opportunity to de-
termine whether the reasons for removing a child are justified, regardless 
of the foster care agency’s concerns. 
C.   Children and Parents Are Particularly Vulnerable to Trauma When 
a Child Is Removed During a Trial Discharge 
The inevitable harm that results from a removal during a trial dis-
charge necessitates a hearing. In addition to the consequences of family 
separation discussed in Part I, a child and her family are particularly vul-
nerable to the trauma from removal during a trial discharge.107 Multiple 
 
 102 As a non-lawyer advocate representing parents in family court at a New York City law 
firm, I discussed with agency caseworkers their rationale for removing children who were 
home on trial discharge. More often than not, the reasons for removal were connected to the 
parent’s alleged divergence from the services that the agency had determined the parent 
needed, such as therapy or parenting classes; there were rarely, if ever, substantive concerns 
about the parent’s ability to care for his child. 
 103 E-mail from Noemi Cotto, supra note 95. 
 104 Misunderstandings among child welfare workers of their own legal obligations, as re-
lated to when they must remove a child, are rife among foster care agencies and ACS offices, 
and have devastating consequences for the families involved with these agencies. 
 105 Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 374 (2004) (citing Matter of Marino S. Jr., 100 
N.Y.2d 361, 372 (2003)) (describing New York’s long-time commitment to keep families to-
gether unless a child’s best interests are endangered). 
 106 See infra Part III.C. for a discussion on how children and their families are vulnerable 
to trauma from a child’s removal while on trial discharge. 
 107 See Anna S. Lau et al., Going Home: The Complex Effects of Reunification on Inter-
nalizing Problems Among Children in Foster Care, 31 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 345, 
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changes in a child’s physical residence increase a child’s likelihood to 
experience behavioral problems108 and decrease a child’s probability of 
finding a permanent home.109 As a result, more children languish in foster 
care, where they may face continued abuse and neglect, among other chal-
lenges.110 
When a child returns home on trial discharge, that child has, at a 
minimum, experienced two drastic changes in where she is living.111 
Changes in foster care placement negatively impact a child’s ability to 
form emotional relationships.112 As a result, it becomes more difficult for 
a family to rebuild their bonds during a trial discharge.113 A subsequent 
removal of a child further hampers the family’s efforts to restore their 
relationship.114 It is in the government’s interest, and in society’s interest, 
 
347 (2003) (stating, based upon a study of 90 children, that the children’s experiences depicted 
a progression of traumatic events from their initial removal and continued throughout the 
placement process); see also William Wan, The Trauma of Separation Lingers Long After 
Children Are Reunited With Parents, WASH POST. (June 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/8AJK-
7FDZ (describing that children who are separated from their parents are vulnerable to further 
trauma, focusing on the immigration context). 
 108 David M. Rubin et al., The Impact of Placement Stability on Behavioral Well-being for 
Children in Foster Care, 119 PEDIATRICS 336, 337 (2007) (finding that children with unstable 
placements were twice as likely to experience behavioral problems at 36 months compared to 
children with stable, long-lasting placements); Rae R. Newton et al., Children and Youth in 
Foster Care: Disentangling the Relationship Between Problem Behaviors and Number of 
Placements, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1363, 1371 (2000) (“[The] number of placement 
changes is the only variable to play a statistically significant role in the prediction of behav-
ioral problems.”). 
 109 See Sara E. Kimberlin et al., Re-entering Foster Care: Trends, Evidence, and Implica-
tions, 31 CHILD & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 471, 473 (2009) (citations omitted) (describing several 
child welfare studies that found a correlation between the number of foster care placements 
and an increased likelihood of re-entering the foster care system after returning home to their 
parents). Alarmingly, these significant changes in a child’s placement often occur because of 
administrative needs, instead of a child’s particular needs. Sigrid James, Why Do Foster Care 
Placements Disrupt? An Investigation of Reasons for Placement Change in Foster Care, 78 
SOC. SERV. REV. 601, 611 (2004). 
 110 See supra Part I.A. 
 111 As discussed supra Part II.B., the government may remove a child at any point in a 
proceeding and, therefore, may return her home multiple times during a case. 
 112 See Sara E. Kimberlin et al., supra note 109, at 473 (citation omitted) (“[A] child must 
move to a new home and form a relationship with a new caregiver . . . . Like any unplanned 
change in placement and loss of permanency, such disruption is likely to be detrimental to 
children’s psychological well-being.”). 
 113 See id. at 472 (citation omitted) (“Repeated changes in caregiver relationships during 
a young child’s first few years of life can result in long-term impairment in forming meaning-
ful interpersonal relationships.”); Roberts, Racial Geography, supra note 13, at 137 (describ-
ing study participants’ accounts that children who had been in foster care had trouble forming 
healthy social relationships later in life). 
 114 Unfortunately, even when families use the trial discharge period to rebuild their bonds, 
“a . . . child welfare service characteristic associated with an increased risk of foster care re-
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to hold a hearing and to ensure that the long-term effects of removal are 
imposed only when absolutely necessary. 
D.   A Parent’s Lack of Rights When the Government Removes Her 
Child During a Trial Discharge 
Currently, a parent does not have the right to a hearing when her 
child is removed on a trial discharge.115 This dilemma is in stark contrast 
to the beginning of a case, when a parent has a right to an emergency 
hearing, where a judge must decide whether a child is at imminent risk of 
harm at home with her parent.116 
Since parents do not have a right to a hearing, attorneys use creative 
advocacy to secure judicial review of the government’s decision to re-
move a child on trial discharge.117 One way to do this is by filing a motion 
to modify the dispositional order and asking the judge to release the child 
to the parent’s custody.118 However, an attorney’s request for judicial re-
view places the burden on the parent or the child, rather than the govern-
ment—who would otherwise need to seek judicial review of any child 
removal.119 
A recent Bronx Family Court decision illustrates the challenges that 
parents face when a foster care agency removes their child on a trial dis-
charge. In this particular case, a father’s two children were living at home 
on trial discharge basis for almost a year.120 Things were going well and 
the family was preparing for a final discharge until the foster care agency 
removed the children in the middle of the night.121 The father filed a mo-
tion seeking an emergency hearing to review the removal and asking the 
 
entry [is] prior involvement with the child welfare system . . . .” Kimberlin et al., supra note 
109, at 473. 
 115 See supra note 94. 
 116 See supra Part II.B. for a discussion of pre-trial emergency hearings pursuant to N.Y. 
FAM. CT. ACT §§ 1027, 1028 (McKinney 2018). If a judge orders a trial discharge, as opposed 
to a foster care agency using its discretion, then the foster care agency may need to move 
pursuant to FAM. CT. § 1061 to modify the order to remove a child during a trial discharge. 
 117 Interview with Erin Cloud, supra note 26. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See, e.g., Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 828 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The burden of 
initiating judicial review must be shouldered by the government. We deal here with an uneven 
situation in which the government has a far greater familiarity with the legal procedures avail-
able for testing its action. In such a case, the state cannot be allowed to take action depriving 
individuals of a most basic and essential liberty interest which those uneducated and unin-
formed in legal intricacies may allow to go unchallenged for a long period of time.”); see 
supra note 94. 
 120 Matter of W. at *1 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2018) (on file with author). 
 121 See id. at *5. 
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judge to return his children to his care.122 A protracted hearing was even-
tually held, involving multiple witnesses and conflicting statements from 
various agency workers, the police officer, the foster parent, and the chil-
dren.123 The police officer disagreed with the caseworker’s description of 
events that had led to the removal.124 Several months later, the judge ruled 
that the children should not have been removed and that it was in their 
best interest to return to their father, and reinstated the trial discharge.125 
The decision was issued around eight months after the children were taken 
from their father. 
A hearing allowed the judge, an impartial fact-finder, to determine 
whether the agency should have removed the children. While determining 
that these children had been unnecessarily separated from their father for 
eight months, however, the judge disagreed that the father had a right to 
an emergency hearing to review the removal.126 In fact, this hearing may 
not have occurred but for the creative advocacy by the father’s lawyer, 
illustrating that the burden to seek judicial review of trial discharge re-
movals is improperly placed on parents.127 This result is unacceptable and 
contrary to New York’s stated commitment to keep families together 
whenever possible.128 
E.   Christina’s Story: The Devastating Impact of Losing One’s Child 
During a Trial Discharge 
The real-life experiences of families may get lost in the mechanics 
explained above. However, it is critical to understand how child removals 
affect parents and children during a trial discharge. The following is an 
example of what a family may experience from this process.129 
Christina was a single-mother in Manhattan; she was a proud native 
New Yorker. Christina and her five-year-old daughter, Jessica, lived in a 
homeless shelter. Even with Christina working overnight shifts at a 
nearby Burger King, it was difficult to make ends meet with the rising 
rents and a high cost of living. 
 
 122 Id. at *1. 
 123 Id. at *5-7. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at *4, *7. 
 126 Id. at *1. 
 127 Id.  
 128 Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 374 (2004) (citing Matter of Marino S. Jr., 100 
N.Y.2d 361, 372 (2003)) (describing New York’s long commitment to keep families together 
unless a child’s best interests are endangered). 
 129 This illustration is based on several cases that I am familiar with from working at a 
New York City law firm that represents parents in family court. 
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Christina became entangled in the child welfare system after a shelter 
worker noticed that there was little food in their kitchen cabinets, and that 
Christina appeared depressed. Christina came home late from work tired, 
and would sometimes be irritable towards the shelter staff. The shelter 
worker called in a report to ACS. ACS then filed a neglect case against 
Christina in family court. At the beginning of the case, Jessica was re-
moved and placed in foster care because the judge was worried about the 
lack of food in Christina’s home and Christina’s behavior towards the 
shelter staff. 
Christina worked hard to get Jessica back home. She started seeing 
a therapist, and she sought help with stocking her cabinets from local food 
banks and charities. Christina also decided to allow the judge to enter a 
finding of neglect against her, rather than face months of prolonged trial 
and further separation from Jessica.130 Soon after the judge entered a find-
ing of neglect against Christina, the foster care agency sent Jessica home 
on trial discharge. 
Christina and Jessica were very close, and Jessica’s time in foster 
care thankfully did not change that. By all accounts, Jessica was a happy 
and thriving young girl when she was home with her mother. They were 
both excited and relieved to be reunited, and, eventually, returned to a 
period of normalcy and routine as mother and daughter. 
Christina’s mother watched Jessica when Christina went to work. 
However, when Christina’s mother moved to Pennsylvania, Christina 
struggled to find childcare for Jessica. She did not make enough money 
at work to afford an overnight babysitter and did not have friends or fam-
ily, other than her mother, whom she trusted to watch Jessica. As a result 
of missing many shifts to stay with Jessica, Christina lost her job at Burger 
King. Christina did her best to eliminate unnecessary expenses, including 
cancelling her phone plan. While money was tight, Christina worked hard 
to ensure that Jessica had enough food to eat, a safe place to sleep, and a 
loving home. 
Christina still had the foster care agency worker in her life. After the 
ups and downs of the case, they had a difficult relationship. In particular, 
Christina felt that her foster care worker did not listen to her or support 
her—she only felt judged. For example, Christina continued to struggle 
to have enough money for groceries and clothes for Jessica, so she asked 
her foster care worker for help. But, rather than provide assistance with 
 
 130 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1051(a) (McKinney 2018), which allows a parent to consent 
to a finding of neglect or abuse without admitting fault, similar to a no-contest plea in criminal 
proceedings; in practice, this is called a “submission.” Telephone Interview with Keith Bau-
mann, supra note 73. 
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food or school supplies, the foster care worker referred her to a financial 
budgeting class. 
Since Christina no longer had a phone plan, she could only make and 
accept calls when her phone was connected to WiFi. The homeless shelter 
did not have WiFi, so communication with the foster care worker became 
difficult. Christina would not receive her missed phone calls or be able to 
reach the worker when she did have access to WiFi. Christina also missed 
three appointments at the foster care agency, which were for periodic case 
conference meetings that the foster care worker scheduled. Still, Jessica 
was healthy, happy, and well cared for. 
After Christina missed the fourth scheduled home visit with the 
worker, the foster care agency decided to hold a meeting with Christina 
to discuss her case. At this point, Jessica had been home on trial discharge 
for nine months. Christina brought Jessica along to the foster care agency, 
as she did not have anyone to watch her. Christina walked into the room 
and was surprised to see the director of the agency there with her foster 
care worker and a supervisor. Within minutes, the director informed 
Christina that the foster care agency was failing Jessica’s trial discharge 
that day. The director said that they had decided to remove Jessica based 
on Christina’s infrequent communication with her foster care worker and 
the four missed appointments for a home visit. The director did not men-
tion any safety concerns for Jessica, as there were none. This meant that 
Christina had to leave the agency that day without her daughter, and Jes-
sica would go straight to a foster home.131 
Christina was shocked; she had no idea that the foster care agency 
was planning to remove Jessica from her care at all, let alone on that day. 
Christina begged the foster care agency to give her some time to get back 
on top of her communication and appointments. She explained that, since 
her mother had moved away, she had lost her job due to lack of childcare 
and needed to cut her phone plan. The foster care agency staff listened, 
but insisted that Jessica needed to be removed as the trial discharge was 
not “working out.” 
At the end of the meeting, Christina asked for a few minutes to say 
goodbye to Jessica. She went outside the room to tearfully hug Jessica 
goodbye and try to explain to her what was happening. Jessica screamed 
the entire length of the hallway that she wanted to stay with her mom, as 
the foster care worker carried Jessica away. Christina went into the bath-
room and sat on the floor sobbing. After working so hard to get Jessica 
 
 131 There is no right to counsel for parents in meetings with foster care workers and child 
protective agencies, such as ACS. ACS, TEAM CONFERENCE POLICY, supra note 100, at 12. 
The foster care agency is not even required to provide notice to the lawyers on the case that 
such a meeting is being held. Id. 
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home, Christina could not imagine going through that process again. She 
felt completely powerless. 
The next day, Christina’s lawyer tried to get the case before the fam-
ily court judge to argue that Jessica should be returned to Christina. The 
next permanency hearing was not scheduled for several months, so her 
lawyer filed a motion to review Jessica’s removal.132 The judge declined 
to hear the motion, saying that taking Jessica from her mother was within 
the foster care agency’s discretion. All Christina wanted was a chance for 
the judge to hear her. She felt that her opinion, as Jessica’s mother, and 
whatever was happening to her daughter in foster care, did not matter to 
the judge. 
As the months passed, Christina became more and more withdrawn, 
despairing that she would never be reunited with Jessica. The foster care 
agency only allowed her visits with Jessica in the foster care agency’s 
visiting room, where Jessica and Christina were supervised by foster care 
workers. Christina also had a hard time getting to visits, as she was work-
ing at a new job bagging groceries far away from home in the Bronx. It 
took Christina nearly two hours to get from her job in the Bronx to the 
foster care agency in Queens. 
When the next court date finally came, three months later, the judge 
finally heard the reasons why Jessica was taken from her mother. The 
judge was appalled, but was also worried by the foster care agency’s re-
ports about Christina missing visits and her depressed mood since the 
agency removed Jessica. The judge said that the foster care agency should 
not have removed Jessica from her mother three months before. However, 
ultimately, the judge decided that it was in Jessica’s best interest to stay 
in her stranger foster home until Christina began visiting consistently with 
Jessica and did a better job at communicating with her foster care worker. 
Christina was deeply upset and became further withdrawn. She felt 
crushed by the injustice of the situation and helpless to change it. Chris-
tina had done everything the judge had previously asked of her to get Jes-
sica back, and had still lost her again. Eventually the foster care agency 
began proceedings to terminate Christina’s parental rights to Jessica. The 
foster care agency counted the time Jessica had been home with Christina 
on trial discharge as time Jessica had been in foster care to prove their 
termination case. 
Despite being a loving mother and doing her best to provide for Jes-
sica in the face of poverty and a lack of support, Christina had initially 
lost Jessica at the beginning of her family court case. Regardless of that 
unfairness, Christina worked really hard to jump through all of the hoops 
that the judge and the foster care agency asked of her to get Jessica home. 
 
 132 This would likely be a motion under FAM. CT. § 1061. 
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Once Jessica came home on trial discharge, she and Christina had spent 
months settling back into their life as a family. Christina’s mother moving 
away caused an unexpected setback, but Christina continued to persist in 
the face of the new challenges. Still, the foster care agency took Jessica 
away again, instead of working with Christina to find childcare and to 
keep her job. A judge refused to review Jessica’s removal until months 
later, when Christina’s situation had become even more difficult due to 
the lack of support. Now, Christina will have to fight to keep her parental 
rights to Jessica—if she loses, she will be erased from Jessica’s life en-
tirely.133 
IV.   THERE MUST BE AN EMERGENCY HEARING TO REVIEW ALL CHILD 
REMOVALS DURING TRIAL DISCHARGE 
Although a failed trial discharge sounds like a harmless administra-
tive procedure, it is the state’s forced separation of children and parents. 
Through this forced separation, the government immediately deprives a 
child of living with his parent and deprives a parent of the physical care 
and custody of her child.134 
A. Due Process Requires a Prompt Hearing 
Due process requires a hearing prior to the deprivation of a parent’s 
fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of a child, or as soon 
as possible thereafter.135 This hearing should be an emergency hearing, 
conducted in court on a daily, consecutive basis. Every day that goes by 
without judicial review of a child’s removal is more time that a family 
may be unnecessarily separated. When a child is removed during a trial 
discharge, she will most likely be forced to hurriedly pack her belongings, 
abruptly change schools, live in a new and unfamiliar neighborhood, and 
only see her parent two or three times a week.136 Given the aggravated 
 
 133 Only a few states currently allow for the restoration of parental rights; in the vast ma-
jority of states, the severing of a parent’s rights to her child is irreversible. See Randi J. O’Don-
nell, Note, A Second Chance for Children and Families: A Model Statute to Reinstate Parental 
Rights After Termination, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 362, 364 (2010). See generally Facing Termina-
tion of Parental Rights, RISE MAG. (Spring 2010), https://perma.cc/6ERT-QQDQ (sharing a 
collection of stories written by parents whose parental rights were terminated). 
 134 See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 135 See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)) (“[I]n those ‘extraordinary situations’ where deprivation 
of a protected interest is permitted without prior process, the constitutional requirements of 
notice and an opportunity to be heard are not eliminated, but merely postponed.”). 
 136 See Chill, supra note 25, at 457 (describing common experiences from the govern-
ment’s removal of children). 
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harm that a child will experience when removed during a trial dis-
charge,137 time is of the essence to determine whether the removal should 
have occurred. Every additional minute that a child spends away from her 
parent increases the long-term impact of the removal; only an emergency 
hearing will appropriately take this potential harm into account. 
1. A Protected Constitutional Interest Is Implicated When a Child 
Is Removed 
A parent must have a procedural due process right to judicial review 
when a child is removed while home on a trial discharge.138 Procedural 
due process applies when the government deprives an individual of a con-
stitutionally protected liberty or property interest.139 The right to family 
integrity is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,140 and is 
“perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by 
th[e] Court” and protected by the U.S. Constitution.141 This right encom-
passes a child and a parent’s reciprocal rights to stay together without 
government interference: a parent’s right to the care, custody, and control 
of her child, and the child’s right to remain with his parent.142 
The Supreme Court has affirmed that a parent’s fundamental right to 
the care and custody of her child continues even after she has been found 
neglectful.143 A parent’s right to care for her child, at a minimum, entitles 
her to a hearing when her right to parent is taken away.144 Therefore, the 
analysis next turns to whether the government’s failure to obtain court 
approval for removals through a failed trial discharge violates the Due 
Process Clause. 
 
 137 See supra Part III.C. for a discussion of the particular fragility of a child who is re-
moved during trial discharge. 
 138 See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972) (“When pro-
tected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.”). 
 139 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
 140 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (discussing the long history of the 
Supreme Court’s recognition of parents’ fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and 
control of their children). 
 141 Id. at 65. 
 142 Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) and Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 
816, 844 (1977)) (“[The] right to the preservation of family integrity encompasses the recip-
rocal rights of both parent and children.”). 
 143 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). See infra Part IV.A.3. for a discus-
sion of the Supreme Court’s findings in Santosky, 455 U.S. 745. 
 144 See Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 826 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 
(1971)). 
2019] SEPARATING FAMILIES WITHOUT DUE PROCESS 31 
2.   The Supreme Court’s Mathews Test Requires a Hearing Upon 
Removal 
Applying the Mathews factors, it is clear that due process requires 
family courts to hold a prompt hearing to review any decision to remove 
a child home on trial discharge. The level of procedural protections re-
quired to satisfy due process is dependent on the specific protected inter-
est that is implicated. Therefore, the Supreme Court has laid out a three 
factor balancing test to determine what procedural protections are re-
quired in a particular case.145 First, a court must consider the nature of the 
private interest at stake.146 Second, a court must determine the risk of er-
roneous deprivation of the interest from the procedures used and the value 
of additional procedural safeguards.147 Third, a court must analyze the 
government’s interest and the administrative burden that the additional 
requirements would create.148 
First, the private interest at stake here is one of the most precious 
interests of our society,149 but the family court’s current treatment of this 
fundamental right does not reflect its importance. Every day that a parent 
is separated from his child places a severe burden on his right to parent 
his child. 
Second, the analysis considers the risk of the government’s wrongful 
deprivation of a parent’s rights under the current procedures used to re-
move children home on trial discharge. The risk of error is extremely 
high, so much so that the New York State Legislature included statutory 
protections in the Family Court Act to challenge child removals at the 
beginning of a case, before a finding of parental unfitness.150 However, 
foster care agencies often improperly decide to remove children home on 
trial discharge based on factors that are not related to the safety of the 
child or even to the best interest of the child.151 Such decisions, if incor-
rect, increase the need and the value of a hearing to review a removal 
during a trial discharge as an additional procedural safeguard. 
 
 145 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See supra Part IV.A.1. for further discussion of the fundamental liberty interest in fam-
ily integrity. 
 150 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 1027, 1028 (McKinney 2018). Even with the best intentions, 
child welfare workers do not often have all of the information necessary when they decide to 
separate a family. It is not uncommon for child welfare workers to later receive information 
that shows the removal was unnecessary. See Sankaran & Church, supra note 24, at 212-13 
(arguing that errors in child removal will continue to occur so long as child welfare agencies 
remain overburdened and susceptible to biases). 
 151 See supra Part III.B. for discussion of the various reasons why foster care agencies 
remove children during a trial discharge. 
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Importantly, a judge can act as an objective third party by reviewing 
all of the information available and determining whether it was the correct 
decision to separate the family. This process was carried out in the recent 
Bronx Family Court decision, where the judge reviewed a removal of two 
children home on trial discharge and subsequently returned the children 
to their father.152 The judge determined that the removal was inappropri-
ate and not in the children’s best interests, which means that the children 
were unnecessarily separated from their father.153 The New York Court 
of Appeals and the New York State Legislature have recognized the seri-
ous harm that parents and children suffer when families are unnecessarily 
separated.154 As a result, the additional safeguard of a hearing could sig-
nificantly reduce the number of unnecessary and mistaken removals of 
children home on trial discharge. 
Third, the analysis examines the government’s interest in its current 
process and how difficult it would be to have additional procedures in 
place. Here, the government has no valid justification for failing to hold 
an emergency hearing to review a removal during a trial discharge. The 
government does not have an interest in separating children from their 
parents when there are no safety risks.155 In fact, New York State has con-
sistently affirmed that its interest is in keeping families together.156 
The government might assert that foster care agencies, with their al-
leged expertise, should have the discretion to begin and to end trial dis-
charges when they deem it appropriate, without judicial review. That ar-
gument is similar to justifications of administrative convenience, which 
courts have not found persuasive in the past.157 Foster care agencies can 
still assist the judge with their expertise in the context of a hearing. Fur-
ther, family courts regularly hold hearings to review child removals—
therefore, there is already a process of implementing emergency hearings 
 
 152 Matter of W. (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2018) (on file with author). 
 153 Id. at *4. 
 154 Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 378 (2004) (reiterating the necessity of balanc-
ing the potential imminent risk of harm to the child with the trauma of removal, and discussing 
the New York Legislature’s stated goal of avoiding unnecessary removals of children). Com-
mentators and researchers have found that even short removals of children from their parents 
cause long-lasting damage. See Sankaran & Church, supra note 24, at 212 (citation omitted). 
 155 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972) (finding the government interest in 
separating children from their parents, absent a finding of unfitness, to be de minimis). 
 156 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(1)(a)(iii) (McKinney 2018) (“[T]he state’s first obliga-
tion is to help the family with services to prevent its break-up or to reunite it if the child has 
already left home . . . .”); Nicholson, 3 N.Y.3d at 374-75 (citing Matter of Marino S. Jr., 100 
N.Y.2d 361, 372 (2003)) (describing New York’s long commitment to keep families together 
unless a child’s best interests are endangered). 
 157 See, e.g., Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657 (discussing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), in 
which the court held that administrative convenience was insufficient to deprive an individ-
ual’s driver’s license without notice and an opportunity to be heard at a hearing). 
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within family courts. The burdens of increased cost and time from addi-
tional hearings do not outweigh the value of protecting parental rights and 
avoiding erroneous child removals. 
All three of the Mathews factors weigh in favor of increasing proce-
dural protections when the government removes a child on trial discharge. 
The private interest implicated from such a removal is incredibly im-
portant, and there is a high risk of the government erroneously taking 
away a parent’s fundamental right. The harm caused by removals, 
whether the removal was a mistake or not, demonstrates that additional 
procedural safeguards are extremely valuable. Finally, the government in-
terest in keeping families together when possible also supports a hearing 
requirement. Therefore, procedural due process will only be satisfied if a 
court promptly reviews all removals of children home on trial discharge. 
3.   The Supreme Court Has Ruled That Parents Are Still Entitled to 
Due Process After a Finding of Neglect 
A finding of neglect does not eliminate a parent’s due process pro-
tections. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that parents with past neglect 
findings are entitled to heightened procedural safeguards: 
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, 
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply 
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary 
custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships 
are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irre-
trievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons 
faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more 
critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting 
state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State 
moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the 
parents with fundamentally fair procedures.158 
As the Supreme Court discussed in Santosky, a parent facing the per-
manent severing of her parental rights deserves heightened due process 
protections.159 A parent is particularly vulnerable in the context of a trial 
discharge, as her child is technically in foster care and, therefore, the clock 
continues to run for when the foster care agency must file to terminate her 
 
 158 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982). Just as a parent’s due process pro-
tections continue after a finding of neglect, a child’s due process rights unquestionably should 
continue after such finding has been entered against her parent; this principle aligns with the 
Second Circuit’s recognition of a parent and a child’s “reciprocal rights” to remain together. 
Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 159 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54. 
34 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:1 
parental rights.160 It is in everyone’s interest to avoid erroneous termina-
tions of parental rights.161 
A prior neglect finding should not eliminate a parent’s right to chal-
lenge a removal through an expedited hearing. As previously discussed, 
before trial, a parent has a right to an emergency hearing, held daily, when 
the government takes her child from her.162 However, a parent is stripped 
of this same right to judicial review post-trial when her child is home on 
trial discharge. This denial of a fundamental parental right is inconsistent 
with due process, and not dependent on the Supreme Court’s extolled le-
gal analysis and procedural safeguards. 
4.   People Facing Parole Revocation Are Entitled to a Hearing; 
Similarly, Parents Whose Children Are Removed During a 
Trial Discharge Are Entitled to a Hearing 
Revocations of parole are a helpful analogy to child removals during 
a trial discharge. Those facing parole and probation revocation proceed-
ings—physical deprivations of liberty that occur after a judge has deter-
mined that they committed crimes—must be afforded due process protec-
tions.163 Just as people on parole are entitled to a hearing if their parole is 
revoked, a parent should similarly be entitled to judicial review of her 
child’s removal during a trial discharge. 
As discussed above, foster care agencies often remove a child during 
a trial discharge because a parent allegedly violated a condition of the trial 
discharge.164 Similarly, many parole revocations are based on technical 
violations.165 Technical violations are non-criminal and occur when a per-
son on parole does not meet one of the conditions of supervision, which 
may include: violating curfew, testing positive for an illegal substance, 
not meeting with a parole officer, and struggling to obtain or to maintain 
 
 160 See supra note 85. 
 161 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, 
ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT 1 
(2016) [hereinafter CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT] (stating that there were 
117,794 children in foster care waiting to be adopted by September 2016). 
 162 See supra Part II.B. for discussion of pre-trial emergency hearings. 
 163 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973) (“Even though the revocation of parole 
is not a part of the criminal prosecution . . . the loss of liberty entailed is a serious deprivation 
requiring that the parolee be accorded due process.”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 
126, 138 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[P]arole revocation is a deprivation of liberty 
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”). 
 164 See supra Part III.B. 
 165 For more information on parole violations, see JEREMY TRAVIS & SARAH LAWRENCE, 
URBAN INST., JUST. POL’Y CTR., BEYOND THE PRISON GATES: THE STATE OF PAROLE IN 
AMERICA (2002). 
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employment.166 In 2017, it was estimated that around 61,000 people were 
in prison because of a technical parole violation.167 
There are many similarities between parole revocation and removals 
of children home on trial discharge. Both parole and a trial discharge take 
place after a finding of guilt, either of a crime or of parental unfitness. In 
both cases, someone has returned home from state custody (foster care or 
prison) on a trial basis, and is at risk of returning to state custody. The 
government is closely scrutinizing and surveilling someone’s life in both 
situations. In addition, both can occur because of conditions that are com-
pletely removed from the original reason for the court involvement—the 
carrying out of a criminal offense or the neglecting of a child. Finally, 
both a parole revocation and a child removal during a trial discharge result 
in serious infringements of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.168 
The Supreme Court has ruled that those facing parole revocations are 
entitled to prompt judicial review to ensure that people on parole do not 
improperly lose their liberty.169 Given the similarities between parole and 
trial discharge, requiring an emergency hearing to review any decision to 
remove a child during a trial discharge is consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent. 
B.   A Hearing Will Maintain the Balance of Powers Between the 
Executive and Judicial Branches 
Requiring judicial review of a child removal during a trial discharge 
also aligns with separation of powers principles. The New York State 
Constitution has a system of three independent and separate branches of 
 
 166 Jeremy Travis & Kirsten Christiansen, Failed Reentry: The Unique Challenges of 
Back-End Sentencing, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249, 251 (2006); Christine S. Scott-
Hayward, The Failure of Parole: Rethinking the Role of the State in Reentry, 41 N.M. L. REV. 
421, 422 (2011). 
 167 Eli Hager, At Least 61,000 Nationwide Are in Prison for Minor Parole Violations, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 23, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://perma.cc/6N2D-S3AG (discussing a 
survey of state jails and prisons, which found that there were more than 61,000 people in 42 
state prison systems for technical parole violations); see also Travis & Christiansen, supra 
note 166, at 251 (stating that national estimates show that around two-thirds of parole viola-
tions, used to force people back into prison, were for technical violations). 
 168 A parole revocation results in a person’s loss of physical liberty, and a child removal 
during a trial discharge results in a parent and a child’s loss of their family integrity. See supra 
note 163 for parole revocation case law, and see supra Part IV.A.1. for a discussion of how a 
child removal infringes on the right to family integrity. 
 169 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973) (“[A] [person on parole] is entitled 
to . . . a preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and detention to determine whether there 
is probable cause to believe that he has committed a violation of his parole . . . .”). 
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government (legislative, executive, judicial) acting as checks and bal-
ances on each other.170 The New York State executive branch oversees 
private foster care agencies.171 The lack of judicial review of foster care 
agency decisions to remove children on trial discharge gives the executive 
branch unchecked, unilateral power to strip a parent of an important con-
stitutional right to parent his child. To fulfill the purposes of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine, the judicial branch should exercise its review 
power to check the executive’s power. 
C.   The Standard at an Emergency Hearing to Review a Trial 
Discharge Removal Should Be the Imminent Risk Standard 
The standard at this emergency hearing should be the same imminent 
risk standard that judges use when a child is first taken from his parent.172 
This standard is particularly significant to a child who is home on trial 
discharge and re-adjusting after being previously removed from his par-
ent. After all, a child home on trial discharge is continuing to recover from 
a traumatic separation from his parent and from subsequent adjustment to 
living somewhere else, which usually entails a complete change in his 
school, neighborhood, and other familiar parts of daily living.173 In this 
context, the potential of harm to the child and to the family unit from 
another removal is very high,174 and the more demanding imminent risk 
standard is warranted. 
 
 170 See Matter of Maron v. Silver, 14 N.Y.3d 230, 258 (2010) (citations omitted) (“The 
concept of the separation of powers is the bedrock of the system of government adopted by 
this State in establishing three coordinate and coequal branches of government, each charged 
with performing particular functions.”). 
 171 Press release, Thomas P. DiNapoli, Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller (July 21, 
2017), http://perma.cc/J8ET-76VQ (“[The state Office of Children and Family Services] reg-
ulates and supervises child welfare services, including foster care and adoption.”). 
 172 As discussed in supra Part II.D., the standard shifts to a best interest of the child stand-
ard at the dispositional hearing. Since trial discharges only occur after a dispositional hearing, 
the default standard would be a best interest of the child standard. When the dispositional order 
places a child in foster care as a continuation of the child’s removal from her parent, it is more 
understandable why a best interest standard would apply (presumably an imminent risk anal-
ysis would have been done when the initial removal took place pre-disposition). By contrast, 
all decisions to remove a child who is at home with her parent should be evaluated within the 
imminent risk framework, as the potential harm from a mistaken removal is so high. Therefore, 
an imminent risk standard should also be used in the rare cases where a judge removes a child 
at disposition and places her in foster care, as a part of the dispositional order. See, e.g., Matter 
of Telsa Z., 71 A.D.3d 1246 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). This would entail a fundamental change 
in the statutory scheme, but it is necessary to satisfy due process and to ensure that a child is 
only removed from her parent when absolutely necessary. 
 173 See Chill, supra note 25, at 457. 
 174 See supra Part III.C. 
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1. There Is Precedent for Use of the Imminent Risk Standard 
Outside of a Pre-Trial Emergency Hearing 
At least one New York family court decision has recognized that the 
Nicholson imminent risk analysis applies to requests for children to return 
to their parents, even when the applications are not made in pre-trial emer-
gency hearings.175 In Matter of Samuel W., the Family Court released the 
child to his mother, before the trial was completed, pursuant to the 
mother’s section 1061 application to modify the prior court order.176 In 
the judge’s analysis of whether to release the child, Samuel, to his 
mother’s care, the Family Court conducted a Nicholson analysis of immi-
nent risk.177 The imminent risk standard allowed the judge to weigh the 
risk of harm from Samuel’s continued placement in foster care against the 
risk of harm from Samuel’s return to his mother’s care. Similarly, the im-
minent risk standard would give proper weight to the potential harm of a 
child on trial discharge being removed from her parent again, in addition 
to considering the imminent risk of harm to the child from remaining 
home with her parent. 
2.   The Imminent Risk Standard Decreases the Impact of Racial 
Bias 
A higher standard allows less room for implicit bias to affect the out-
come, acting as a check on racial bias that infiltrates the child welfare 
system.178 Research has documented racial disparities (especially harm-
ing Black children) at every decision-making stage of a child welfare 
 
 175 In current practice, the imminent risk standard is only applied in pre-trial emergency 
hearings pursuant to N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 1027, 1028 (McKinney 2018). 
 176 Matter of Samuel W., No. NA09331/14, 2015 WL 5311117, at *1 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Kings 
Cty. 2016). The mother had previously lost an emergency hearing pursuant to FAM. CT. § 1027 
and, therefore, was not entitled to another emergency hearing pursuant to Id. § 1028. Matter 
of Samuel W., 2015 WL 5311117, at *1. The fact that the case was mid-trial also meant that 
the standard had not yet shifted to a best interest standard, which occurs at disposition. Id. 
 177 Matter of Samuel W., 2015 WL 5311117, at *1 (noting the fact that the young child, 
Samuel, had already been moved five times since the beginning of the case). Section 1061 
hearings are guided by a “good cause” directive in the statute, meaning the judge here was not 
required to apply the imminent risk standard. FAM. CT. § 1061. 
 178 See Ledesma, supra note 18, at 51-56 (describing how subjective standards allow in-
ternal biases of judges and workers to affect outcomes in child welfare cases); CHILDREN’S 
BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT, supra note 161, at 2 (citing government data on national fos-
ter care statistics, finding that 56% of children in foster care were not white as of October 20, 
2017); see generally ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 13. 
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case.179 In particular, Black children are often removed from their fami-
lies, more frequently than other children, for reasons that are unconnected 
to imminent risk concerns.180 Further, Black families are less likely to be 
offered supportive in-home services, which could prevent the need for a 
child’s removal.181 
Although there are a vast array of factors that may play a role in a 
child removal decision, racial bias is highly likely to influence the deter-
mination. Racism has been shown to impact removal decisions on an 
emergency basis at the beginning of a case—there is no reason to suggest 
that race would not also impact removal decisions made during trial dis-
charge.182 Allowing for less discretion in the decision-making process, 
through the higher imminent risk standard, could act as a check on the 
inevitable racial influence in child welfare workers’ decisions, including 
the foster care workers’ decisions to remove children on trial discharge.183 
 
 179 See, e.g., JINA LEE ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW, IMPLICIT BIAS IN THE CHILD 
WELFARE, EDUCATION, AND MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEMS 2-4 (2015) (discussing racial dispro-
portionality at various stages of a child welfare case, disfavoring Black children in particular, 
including the initial reporting and the investigation stage, the case substantiation, the child 
removal, and the length of time a child is forced to stay in foster care); Alan J. Dettlaff et al., 
Disentangling Substantiation: The Influence of Race, Income, and Risk on the Substantiation 
Decision in Child Welfare, 33 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 1630, 1634-35 (2011) (explain-
ing study results that demonstrate how racial bias impacts decision-making at the case sub-
stantiation stage); CTR FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. POLICY, THE RACE + CHILD WELFARE PROJECT, 
FACT SHEET 1: BASIC FACTS ON DISPROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 
IN THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM (2004), http://cssp.org/uploadFiles/factSheet1.pdf. Dangerously, 
some argue that racial disproportionality in foster care is not a result of racism, but is instead 
reflective of higher rates of actual maltreatment in Black families. See Elizabeth Bartholet, 
The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare: False Facts and Dangerous Di-
rections, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 871 (2009). 
 180 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN IN FOSTER 
CARE: ADDITIONAL HHS ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO HELP STATES REDUCE THE PROPORTION IN 
CARE 20-25 (2007) (summarizing findings regarding various factors that increase the impact 
of racial bias and contribute to Black children being unnecessarily removed); Dettlaff et al., 
supra note 179, at 1635 (explaining that child welfare workers perceived a greater risk of 
abuse and neglect in Black families, as compared to other families). 
 181 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 180, at 21-22. 
 182 See Simon, supra note 32, at 359-62 (exploring how racial bias infiltrates decisions to 
remove children without prior judicial review or court order). 
 183 Of course, this does not always happen in practice because racial bias also permeates 
the judiciary. See sources cited supra note 55 (discussing racial disparities between family 
court judges and families forced into court, and how that negatively impacts accused parents). 
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3.   A Higher Standard Will Focus the Hearing on the Child’s 
Safety 
The imminent risk standard would allow a judge to focus all removal 
decisions on the child’s safety. Under the current practice, there are myr-
iad conditions in place for a trial discharge that, if “violated,” could 
prompt a child’s removal.184 The legal standard for a removal is not the 
violation of a court order or a foster care agency plan, however.185 Foster 
care agency workers often misunderstand their legal obligations and con-
fuse how court orders should impact a decision to remove a child from 
her home, which divorces a decision to remove a child on trial discharge 
from any concrete safety concerns for the child.186 The imminent risk 
standard would clarify the actual reason for the removal, determine 
whether there are active safety concerns for the child, and hold the foster 
care agency accountable to keep a child at home, except when there are 
concrete safety concerns. Judges must ensure that a child and her parent 
are not unnecessarily separated and traumatized. 
4.   The Imminent Risk Standard Furthers the Rehabilitative 
Purpose of the Family Court Act 
Finally, applying the imminent risk standard to review a child re-
moval during a trial discharge aligns with the Family Court Act’s purpose 
to “rehabilitate” and to reunify families.187 A family court proceeding’s 
goal is not to punish a parent for wrongdoing, but to address the underly-
ing problems that initially brought the family into court.188 In light of the 
governing rehabilitative law and the disruption in family reunification 
caused by a child removal, there should be a higher burden on the gov-
ernment to justify all decisions to remove children from their homes. An 
imminent risk standard would appropriately ensure that the government’s 
decision to remove a child is justified. 
CONCLUSION 
A shared recognition of injustice may explain why people across the 
United States experienced such visceral reactions in response to the im-
ages and the sounds of the children at the border being dragged away 
 
 184 Email interview with Noemi Cotto, supra note 95. 
 185 See Part II.B. for an explanation of the imminent risk standard, which applies in an 
emergency hearing when a child is removed pre-disposition. At the least, the best interest of 
the child standard should govern post-disposition removals, although this Note argues for an 
imminent risk standard to review all removals. See supra note 172. 
 186 See supra note 104. 
 187 See supra note 52. 
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screaming from their parents. Yet, this same painful scene is occurring to 
our neighbors every day, with parents fighting simply for a hearing to 
evaluate the government’s removal of their child. While parents advocate 
for some form of judicial review, children struggle to deal with the trauma 
of being removed from their parents, trauma that will continue to affect 
them for the rest of their lives. Legislation that will guarantee an emer-
gency hearing to review the government’s decision to remove a child dur-
ing a trial discharge is urgently needed. Such legislation will provide par-
ents with the due process that they are entitled to under the U.S. 
Constitution and will reflect New York State’s commitment to keep fam-
ilies together. 
